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Abstract
Michael Hudson has suggested that the global financial system since the post-Bretton
Woods system could be regarded as the ‘US Treasury bill standard’ system, in the sense
that monetary authorities in developed countries were, effectively, forced to buy US
Treasury securities in the 1970s. Analogous to his view, the global financial system in the
2000s, characterized by emerging Asian official ownership of US Treasuries, could be
called by ‘the revised US Treasury securities standard system’. The revised US Treasury
securities standard system in the 2000s depends on not only foreign official demand for
US Treasuries, but also, most importantly, a new type of market-driven demand for US
Treasuries as ‘the globally accepted collateral’ in the unregulated shadow banking
system. How are the official and private demands for US Treasuries fundamentally linked?
In order to consider the question, the paper proposes the development of ‘the US
Treasury securities-repo market nexus’ in the 2000s. The notion captures the role of US
Treasury securities, whose market value and creditworthiness are sustained by emerging
Asian official ownership, serving as the globally accepted collateral for creating new type
of USD-denominated short-term liabilities, that is repo liabilities, to non-US residents.
Importantly, the procyclical leverage during the US housing bubble intensified the
market-driven demand for US Treasuries as globally accepted collateral, which induced
large broker-dealers in the US and Europe, the center of the shadow banking system, to
develop new financial instruments and financial innovations in the creation and
intermediation of the globally accepted collateral. This development amplified the
volatility in the issuance of USD-denominated repo liabilities by the broker-dealers vis-àvis offshore financial centers (OFCs) such as the UK and the Caribbean, contributing to
the explosion of USD-denominated financialization in the global context in the 2000s
prior to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). However, since the GFC, the lack of dynamics in
the procyclical leverage led to the structural stagnation in USD-denominated
financialization in the global context in the 2010s.
Keywords: Collateral asset, repo market, shadow banking system, US dollar, and US
Treasury securities.
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I. Introduction
The US Treasury securities market has been the deepest and most liquid government
market for private investors and monetary authorities in the world. In fact, foreign
ownership of US Treasuries has increasingly risen since the 1970s, especially in the 2000s.
The rise of emerging Asian countries as major foreign official ownership of US Treasuries
was attributed with the structural imbalances in current account across the Pacific in the
2000s. While emerging Asian countries had current account surpluses, the US had current
account deficits. The imbalance in current account might have led to the appreciation of
the currencies of the surplus countries in emerging Asia that did not want to place their
domestic exporters at a competitive disadvantage in world trade. In response, monetary
authorities in emerging Asian countries, particularly China, have intervened to absorb the
surplus dollars, most of which were used to acquire US Treasuries in the 2000s.
The appetite for US Treasuries from foreign official investors were already highlighted
in the 1970s. Monetary authorities in developed countries such as Western Europe and
Japan had intervened to absorb the surplus dollars, most of which were forcibly steered
toward official investments on US Treasury bonds in the 1970s. Based on this finding,
Michael Hudson suggested that the global financial system since the post-Bretton Woods
system could be regarded as the ‘US Treasury bill standard’ system. (Hudson (1972/2003);
Hudson (1977/2005)) Analogous to his view, the global financial system in the 2000s,
characterized by emerging Asian official ownership of US Treasuries, could be called by ‘the
revised US Treasury securities standard system’.
What is a new demand for US Treasuries in the revised US Treasury securities
standard system in the 2000s? The revised US Treasury securities standard system in the
2000s depends on not only foreign official demand for US Treasuries, but also, most
importantly, a new type of market-driven demand for US Treasuries as ‘the globally
accepted collateral’ in the unregulated shadow banking system.
How are the official and private demands for US Treasuries fundamentally linked? In
order to consider the question, the paper proposes the development of ‘the US Treasury
securities-repo market nexus’ in the 2000s. The notion captures the role of US Treasury
securities, whose market value and creditworthiness are sustained by emerging Asian
official ownership, serving as the globally accepted collateral for creating new type of
USD-denominated short-term liabilities, that is the repo liabilities, to non-US residents.
The issuance of repo liabilities in the shadow banking system has more dynamic in credit
expansion than the commercial banking system, although they do not serve as final
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means of payment.
Importantly, the procyclical leverage during the US housing bubble intensified the
market-driven demand for US Treasuries as the globally accepted collateral, which
induced large broker-dealers in the US and Europe, the center of the shadow banking
system, to develop new financial instruments and financial innovations in the creation
and intermediation of the globally accepted collateral. This development amplified the
volatility in the issuance of USD-denominated repo liabilities by the broker-dealers vis-àvis offshore financial centers (OFCs) such as the UK and the Caribbean, contributing to
the explosion of financialization in the global context in the 2000s.
Following the introduction, Section II overviews the US Treasury securities standard
system in the 1970s. Section III describes the revised US Treasury securities standard
system in the 2000s. Section IV analyzes the development of the US Treasury securitiesrepo market nexus in the 2000s. Section V discusses that the intensification in the marketdriven demand for US Treasuries as the globally accepted collateral during the US housing
bubble amplified the volatility in the issuance of repo liabilities by the broker-dealers visà-vis OFCs. Section VI explains the revised US Treasury securities standard system since the
Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09. And, the last section (Section VII) considers two
questions: What is the difference between the revised US Treasury securities standard
system in the 2000s and the past system in the 1970s? And, how does the revised US
Treasury securities standard system change in the 2010s?
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II. US Treasury securities standard system in the 1970s
In this section, we overview Hudson’s US Treasury securities standard system in the
1970s. In doing so, it is necessary to go back to examine the external discipline of US
balance-of-payments deficits before and after the demise of Bretton Woods (BW) system.
In the BW system, the US would convert the dollars into gold at $35 per ounce with
foreign monetary authorities, while major developed nations were required to fix the value
of their national currencies against the dollar within plus or minus 1% of parity by
intervening in foreign exchange markets. Under the fixed foreign exchange system, the US
played a special role as an ultimate supplier or absorber of dollar reserves through its policy
of converting gold with them. (Solomon (1982), 211) In the 1960s, while the US
government pursued not only expansionary fiscal spending for social welfare at home to
facilitate US import more, it increased its military overseas spending in relation to the Cold
War in Southwestern Asia and elsewhere in the world. Along with the US official spending,
US private sector, including US multinationals and US large banks, expanded their external
investments and lendings toward Western Europe. The expansion of US domestic and
external spending was accompanied with the deterioration in the US balance-of-payments
deficits, by which advanced countries encountered the problem of the surplus dollars in
the 1960s, not the shortage dollars in the 1950s. The pile of the surplus dollars not only
could drive massive flows from the dollar to other major currencies that would finally be
changed to gold with the US on a large scale. In order to prevent the rapid reduction of US
gold holding, it was desirable for the US to adjust its balance-of-payments deficits soon or
later. But the US balance-of-payments deficits had increasingly risen in the 1960s.
Instead, how did the US and other advanced countries cope with the surplus dollars
in the 1960s? First, the US and other developed countries cooperated to enforce some
measures and arrangements for defense of the US legal gold parity at $35 an ounce. Second,
foreign monetary authorities in developed countries---specifically the surplus countries of
Western Europe and Japan---intervened to absorb the surplus dollars in foreign exchange
markets. Most of the surplus dollars held by developed countries were used for purchasing
US Treasury bonds, rather than exchanging them to gold with the US. Despite the measures
and arrangements to handle the surplus dollars, the US balance-of-payments deficits
deteriorated, and then the US gold holding decreased in the 1960s. Between 1958, when
was the beginning of era of the surplus dollars, and 1971, the rise in official foreign
liabilities was $42 billion, and the loss of US gold reserves totaled $12.6 billion. (Gilbert
(1980), 125)
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Finally, on August 15th, 1971, President Nixon formally announced that the US would
no longer convert its gold to foreign monetary authorities for the surplus dollars, that is
the Nixon Shock. By doing so, the US lacked, practically, the external discipline of its
balance-of-payments deficits. Thereafter, major advanced countries shifted from fixed to
floating exchange rate in 1973. In the 1970s, the US official encouraged the devaluation of
the dollar, in order not only to reduce the value of foreign official holdings of dollar reserve,
but also to restore US competitiveness in manufacturing sector. It was expected that the
US ‘benign neglect’ policy for its balance-of-payments deficits would diminish the
international role of the dollar as reserve currency.
In spite of the US benign neglect policy, the dominate role of the dollar as reserve
currency had been maintained in the 1970s. Why? At that time, other developed countries
faced two ways. First, they could keep their international competitiveness by preventing
the appreciation of their own currencies to the dollar through purchasing the surplus
dollars, which were likely to cause an expansion in domestic money supply that that would
bring about inflation or asset bubble there. Second, they could accept appreciation of their
own currency, which would hurt their international competitiveness. (Helleiner (1995),
112-13) Their main choice was the former. Specifically, foreign monetary authorities in
Western Europe and Japan had continued to intervene countercyclically to absorb the
surplus dollars, most of which were, effectively, steered for official investments on US
Treasury bonds.1 Michal Hudson suggested that the global financial system since the postBretton Woods system, characterized by foreign official ownership of US Treasuries, could
be regarded as the ‘US Treasury bill standard’ system. (Hudson (1972/2003); Hudson
(1977/2005)),
In summary, monetary authorities in developed countries intervened
countercyclically to absorb the surplus dollars, which resulted from the US balance-ofpayments deficits, in order to stabilize the value of dollar in cooperation with the US. US
Treasuries acted here as “an exploitative financial device” (Hudson (1972/2003), xv) to suck
up the surplus dollars held by developed countries. Therefore, it can be analyzed that the
US Treasury securities as foreign exchange reserve in the 1970s functioned to absorb
countercyclically the surplus dollars, contributing to sustain the US Treasury securities
standard system in the 1970s.
As a background, foreign official ownership of the US public debt had increased, and its share reached at a peak of
more than 80 percent in total of foreign holding in the 1970s. (Brain Hager (2016), 117-8)
1
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III. The revised US Treasury securities standard system in the 2000s
III.I Emerging Asian countries as major holders of US Treasury securities
In addition to foreign official investors, foreign private investors have also increased
their holdings of US Treasury securities since the 1980s, and amounted to a peak in the
second half of 1990s. But a reversal emerged in the 2000s, and foreign official holdings of
US Treasuries reached a peak of $570 billion in 2009, while foreign private ownership was
-15 billion, respectively, as illustrated in Figure 1

Figure 1 Foreign Official and Foreign Private Holdings of US Treasury Securities
(millions of dollars)

Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.

Considering the importance of emerging Asian official holding of US Treasuries in the
2000s, Michael Hudson begins the second edition of Super Imperialism in 2002 as below:
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“As of summer 2002 the US Treasury is pursuing the same strategy of “benign neglect” for
its balance-of-payments deficits that I did thirty years ago…No one anticipated that
America’s federal budget deficit during the 1990s would be financed by China, Japan and
other Asian countries rather than by American taxpayers and domestic investors. Yet this
international exploitation was implicit in the U.S. Treasury bill standard.” (Hudson
(1972/2003), i, xii).
The emergence of emerging Asian countries as major foreign official investors toward US
Treasuries was attributed with the structural increases of the imbalances in current
account across the Pacific in the 2000s. While emerging Asian countries had current
account surpluses, the US had current account deficits. The imbalance across the Pacific
might lead to the appreciation of own currencies in the surplus countries in emerging Asia,
which did not want to place their domestic exporters at a competitive disadvantage in
world trade. In response, monetary authorities in emerging Asian countries have
discretionarily intervened to absorb the surplus dollars, most of which were used for
acquiring US Treasuries. As a result, China became a major investor of holding US Treasuries.
At yearend of 2008, China surpassed Japan to become the largest holder of US Treasury
securities with total holdings at $807.5 billion, compared with $668.9 billion held by Japan,
the second-largest holder. (Nguyen (2009), 15) Hao (2016) calls the seemingly insatiable
demand for US assets as “China’s addiction to US Treasuries”.
What is difference on foreign official ownerships of US Treasuries between major
developed countries in the 1970s and emerging Asian countries in the 2000s? Although
monetary authorities in developed nations such as Western Europe and Japan have no
consensus on how the global financial system might be reformed or replaced since the BW
system(Eichengreen (2008),128), these countries have implicitly shared an understanding
that they intervened jointly to absorb the surplus dollars in order to stabilize the value of
dollar in cooperation with the US since the 1970s. For example, the US-led international
cooperation in Group of five (G5) worked remarkably on the Plaza agreement in 1985 and
the Louvre agreement in 1987. (Kindleberger (1978/2005), 273) On the contrary, monetary
authorities in emerging Asian countries have intervened more discretionarily to absorb the
surplus dollars, compared to the jointly coordinated intervention by developed countries
for maintaining the US-centered global financial system.
Analogous to Hudson’s view in the 1970s, one can say that the global financial system
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in the 2000s, characterized by emerging Asian official ownership of US Treasuries, could be
called by ‘the revised US Treasury securities standard system’.
III.II US Treasury securities as the globally accepted collateral
Crucially, the revised US Treasury securities standard system in the 2000s depends on
not only foreign official demand for US Treasury securities, but also, most importantly, a
new type of market-driven demand for US Treasuries as ‘the globally accepted collateral’
in the unregulated shadow banking system in the 2000s.
Collateral assets act as core element of private market’s self-regulation in the
unregulated shadow banking system (Riles (2011), 159), as Krarup (2019, 250) states.
Whereas bank deposits in the commercial banking system are regulated by monetary
authorities and protected by deposit insurance, the new type of short-term instruments
such as repo liabilities issued in the shadow banking system are, more or less, unregulated.
Instead of the public backstops in the commercial banking system, collateral assets could
function in mitigating counterparty credit risk, acting as a liquid store value with which
firms can manage their funding, and enabling financial institutions to fund purchases of
financial assets. (Baranova et al. (2016), 2) With respect the last role, the use of collateral
makes borrowings in repo market, the most important wholesale market for financial
institutions and private investors, less costly and less risky than borrowing from unsecured
money markets.
What sustains the role of US Treasury securities as the globally accepted collateral?
The main reason is that the US Treasury securities market has been the deepest and most
liquid government market for private sectors and monetary authorities in the world,
strengthening the securities’ unique roles in US domestic and global financial markets: the
primary means of financing the US federal government, an important market for the US
Federal Reserve (Fed)’s implementation of monetary policy, a significant investment
instrument and hedging vehicle for global investors, a risk-free benchmark and index for
financial instruments, domestic and international safe-heaven, and foreign exchange
reserves held by other countries. (Schinasi et al. (2001); Gordon and Muir (2015); US
Department of the Treasury et al. (2015)) The unique roles contribute to foreign official
and private demand for US Treasury securities, resulting in the higher involvement by nonUS residents in the US Treasury bonds market than other advanced countries. (Schinasi et
al. (2001)) The average share of foreign ownership of US Treasuries was 4.58 percent in the
1960s, 15.51 percent in the 1970s, 14.24 percent in the 1980s, 20.96 percent in the 1990s,
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and jumped to 36.21 percent in the 2000s, respectively, in total holding of US Treasury
securities. In 2013, the share reached a peak of 42.44 percent. (The data from US financial
Account of the United States) This strong demand from non-US residents implies that US
Treasury securities are seen as the safest collateral assets for financial institutions and
private investors in the world, which can be converted to cashes and deposits with the
lowest haircut in repo market in all states of market. Owing to the overwhelming advantage
of US Treasuries as collateral assets which government bonds in other advanced countries
do not have, US Treasury securities can be deemed as the globally accepted collateral in
the shadow banking system.
In short, in addition to emerging Asian official demand for US Treasuries as foreign
exchange reserve, new type of the market-driven demand for US Treasuries as the globally
accepted collateral in the shadow banking system reinforced the revised US Treasuries
standard system in the 2000s.
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IV. The development of ‘the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus’ in the 2000s
How are the official and private demands for US Treasury securities fundamentally
linked in the 2000s?
Interestingly, Sarai (2009, 80) suggests that ‘the Treasury-money market nexus’, in
which US Treasury securities are regarded as ideal assets to link the high degree of
liquidity with the expansion of repo market.2 The volume of the repo market is
increasingly recognized to be just as important a driver of credit creation in the regulated
commercial banking as money itself just before the GFC of 2007-09. (Singh and Stella
(2012)) Total repo activity in the US reached its peak before the GFC, ranging from $5 to
$10 trillion (Baklanova et al. (2015), 1). Notably, the volume of short-term money funding
through the repo market is, ultimately, tied to the market value and creditworthiness of
collateral assets such as US Treasury securities. Hence, we would call the short-term
money funding through the repo market which is linked to US Treasury securities market
as ‘the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus’. In what follows, we analyze how the US
Treasury securities-repo market nexus developed in the 2000s, in order to analyze the
official and private demands for US Treasuries in the revised US Treasury securities
standard system are fundamentally linked.
On the one hand, emerging Asian official accumulation of US Treasuries bolsters
their market value and creditworthiness as the most important safe assets over the world.
Since the end of 1990s, emerging Asian countries have rapidly accumulated US Treasuries,
led by the increase in current account surplus and the desire to hold foreign exchange
reserves for countering the recurrent of finance crisis as Asian crisis in 1997-98. Their heavy
purchases of US Treasuries lowered the US long-term bond yields. Warnock and Warnock
(2009) estimate that absent substantial foreign inflows into US government bonds 10-year
Treasury yields would be 80 basis points higher. The outstanding of US domestic private
and foreign private holdings of US Treasuries has been flat in the 2000s before the GFC
(Goda et al. (2013), 114-115), in comparison with the ballooning in US public debt during
the period. Other things being equal, the leveling off in US domestic private and foreign
private holdings of US Treasuries might decrease potentially the market value and
2 Some studies stress the connection between capital market developments and repo market amplified the supply of
liquidity in the shadow banking system in the 2000s before the GFC. (For instance, Adrian and Shin (2010); Mehrling et
al. (2013)) Furthermore, Garbor (2016) provides the concept of ‘the repo trinity’, which connects financial stability with
liquid government bond markets and free repo markets.
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creditworthiness of US Treasuries, raising significantly the costs of borrowing from US
private sectors as well as the costs incurred by the US federal government to finance its
public debt. Thus, the significant purchase of US Treasuries by emerging Asian official
investors served to counter negative impacts on a market value and creditworthiness of
the securities in the 2000s.
On the other hand, US Treasuries function as the globally accepted collateral for
creating new type of short-term liabilities in repo market (i.e. the repo liabilities), as an
alternative to bank deposits. (Singh (2012)) A handful of large broker-dealers, the legal
description of the entities at the center of investment banking (Bayoumi (2017/2018), 59),
in the US and Europe serves increasingly to intermediate collateral assets across borders
on a large scale. (Pozsar (2014); Singh (2017)) In intermediating collateral assets for secured
funding such as repos, the pathways that collateral takes are two-way flows: when there is
cash funding in one direction from ultimate lenders to ultimate borrowers, there is a flow
of collateral in other direction. (Aguiar et al (2016), 8-10) Importantly, large broker-dealers
play a central role for financial intermediation of the globally accepted collateral across
borders.
How did large broker-dealers function to intermediate the globally accepted collateral
in the 2000’s prior to the GFC? While key provides of primary collateral to the brokerdealers were hedge funds and custodian on behalf of pensions, insurers, and official sector
accounts (Singh (2011)), key providers of cash funding was US’ Money Market Mutual
Funds (MMMFs) which accumulate ‘the institutional cash pools’, consisting large cash
balances from global nonfinancial corporations and asset managers. (Pozsar (2011)) Driven
by structural and historical changes linked to the increasing inequality in income, the
massive accumulation of cash pools by multinationals, and the growing of pensions and
insurance, the volume of institutional cash pools rose from $100 billion in 1990 to over
$2.2 trillion at their peak in 2007. (Pozsar (2011), 5-6)) US’ MMMFs sought to invest part
of their abundant cash funds in alternative assets to insured bank deposits---that is, safe,
short-term and liquid instruments---including short-term government guaranteed
instruments, particularly US Treasury securities and US Agency securities. However, the
supply of US Treasuries and US Agencies are exogenously limited by US federal government
and US government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). This shortage, which implies the excess
demand for dollar-denominated safe, short-term and liquid money market instruments,
has been estimated to amount to $1.1, $1.6 and $1.6 trillion in 2005, 2006 and 2007,
respectively. (Pozsar (2011), 9-10). In response to the excess demand, large broker-dealers
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created endogenously USD-denominated short-term liabilities through the repo market.
What does the issuance of repo liabilities make difference to credit expansion in the
unregulated shadow banking system, compared to credit creation of bank deposits in
regulated commercial banking system? An interesting recent body of literature discuss the
importance of repo liabilities as shadow money. (Gabor and Vestergaard (2016) (2018);
Murau (2017); Nersisyan and Dantas (2017); Sagambati (2019)) One the one hand,
commercial banks create short-term liabilities, that is bank deposits, ex nihilo through new
loans and mortgages, which function as final means of payment in modern financial system.
In order to create bank deposits, commercial banks must hold a very small amount of highpowered money at central bank, owing to their subject to domestic banking regulations
such as reserve requirements. On the other hand, repo is the most important wholesale
market for the broker-dealers to issue short-term liabilities, based on the market value and
creditworthiness of collateral assets. Specifically, the broker-dealers issue collateralized
promise with the MMMFs to repurchase collateral asset at a future agreed date, that is a
repurchase agreement, at the same time that they borrow cash (bank deposit) from the
MMMFs during the term. Notably, the issuance of repo liability drives the money supply to
become more elastic in the shadow banking systems, compared with the commercial
banking system. (Tokunaga and Epstein (2018)) In this respect, the issuance of repo
liabilities in the shadow banking system has more dynamic in credit expansion than the
commercial banking, though it does not serve as final means of payment (Michell (2017),
361; Tropeano (2018), 80-82; Caverzasi et al. (2019), 1045).
In turn, what is indispensable for the broker-dealers which create repo liabilities on
the liabilities side is to find sources of collateral assets on the assets side. As explained
before, the broker-dealers received primary collateral assets from hedge funds and
custodian, insurers, and official sector accounts. Singh and Stella (2012) define the scope
of very small base for credit expansion in the shadow banking system as below: First,
deposits are held at the central bank, that is high-powered money (D); Second, good
collateral in all states of nature, can be converted to D at no haircut (C1); Finally, C2 is
collateral that under normal market condition is ‘good’, but otherwise can lose value. The
sum of D and C1 held by banks could function as the ‘ultimate liquidity’. Grounded on their
definition, in term of the US shadow banking system, while US Treasury securities could be
regarded as C1, which is the globally accepted collateral that can be converted into highpowered money in all states of financial markets, C2 includes US Agency securities and a
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broad range of the private-label US debt securities, issued by securitization.3
Put it different way, the issuance of repo liabilities indicates that large broker-dealers
in the US and Europe relied on cheaper dollar borrowings from the US’ MMMFs. Along
with the increased demand from the MMMFs in the 2000s, the yield on short-term debt
instruments is lower than would otherwise be expected by the added increased safety
and liquidity of these instruments. The yield differences are called by the money
premium, which gives the private sectors incentives to fund themselves by issuing shortterm money instruments. (Scott (2016), 235) It is likely that the money premium allowed
the large broker-dealers to issue a large amount of repo liabilities, enabling them to
borrow massive cheaper short-term dollar funds in the 2000s before the GFC.
To return to the question posed at the beginning of this section, the market-driven
demand for US Treasury securities as the globally accepted collateral, whose market value
and creditworthiness were sustained by emerging Asian official ownership, enabled the
large broker-dealers to expand cheaper short-term dollar borrowings through the repo
market in the 2000s, given the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus.

Singh and Stella (2012, 7) refer that US Agency bonds could be safe assets due to an explicit guarantee ex-post during
the GFC. However, we do not here include US Agency securities in C1, due to the loss of value of the securities during
the GFC of 2007-09.
3
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V. The explosion of USD-denominated financialization in the global context
V.I. The procyclical leverage during the US housing bubble
The US economy experienced a housing bubble from 2004 to 2006, in that housing
prices surged rapidly during this period. The US housing bubble led large broker-dealers to
have surplus equity, in the sense that its equity is larger than the amount required to meet
its Value-at-Risk (VAR) constraint, driven by the rising market values of collateral assets
during the period. (Adrian and Shin (2010); Shin (2010)) In response to the surplus capacity
at their balance sheets, the broker-dealers took aggressively on more short-term dollar
financing in the wholesale funding market such as repos, thus leading to their excessive
leverage. Because their leverage was so high during the US housing bubble, leverage at the
broker-dealers could be regarded as procyclical. (Adrian and Shin (2010), 17) Thus, the
procyclical leverage drove the broker-dealers to depend heavily on repo-based short-term
dollar borrowing, overstretching their balance sheets during the housing bubble.
In turn, the procyclical leverage could enhance the market-driven demand for US
Treasuries as the globally accepted collateral, given the US Treasury securities-repo market
nexus. Based on the definition of the ultimate liquidity by Singh and Stella (2012), the
imbalances between the strong demands for C1, which is good collateral in all states of
nature, and its limited supply of US Treasury securities by the US federal government
increased during the housing bubble. In response, large broker-dealers took three ways.
First, they pursued ‘the global financial plumbing’ of the collateral assets in global bilateral
collateral market. (Singh (2017)) The size of global bilateral collateral market, where the
global money and collateral exchange takes place, was US$10 trillion in 2007. (Singh (2017),
10) Only a small number of large broker-dealers, for example large 10-15 banks, have the
capabilities to regularly move collateral assets across borders on a large scale. 4 (Singh
(2017), 15) Second, they created the private-label securitized collateral assets, based on
US housing loans, especially the subprime mortgages, including mortgage-backed
securities (MBSs), asset-backed securities ABSs (ABSs), and collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs). The creation of the private-label securitized collateral assets would enhance the
volume of C2, which is good collateral under normal market condition. Finally, they reused
intensively collateral assets (i.e. rehypothecated) for responding to huge demand for
4 Major broker-dealers in the collateral industry include Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, Bank of
America/Merrill, and Citibank in the U.S. In Europe and elsewhere, important collateral dealers are Deutsche Bank,
UBS, Barclays, Credit Suisse, Société Générale, BNP Paribas, HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, and Nomura in Japan. (Singh
(2019), 8)
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collateral assets. Singh (2011) finds that the velocity of collateral---defined as the ratio
between primary source collateral and total collateral received---can support multiple repo
transactions. The total collateral received as of end-2007 ($10 trillion) and compares it to
the primary sources of collateral ($3.3 trillion). Thus, the velocity of collateral was equal to
about 3 (=$10 trillion/3.3 trillion). (Singh (2011, 13)) The development in new financial
instruments and financial innovations in the creation and intermediation of the globally
accepted collateral in the shadow banking system amplified the procyclical borrowing to
very small base of the ultimate liquidity in US domestic financial intermediaries during the
US housing bubble. Figure 2 is shown in the ultimate liquidity leverage.

Figure 2 Ultimate Liquidity Leverage in US Domestic Financial Intermediaries

Note 1: Based on Singh and Stella (2012), Figure 3.
Note 2: The ultimate liquidity leverage = total liabilities of domestic financial sectors / bank deposits held at
central bank + US Treasury securities.
Source: US financial Account of the United States.

The ultimate liquidity leverage increased suddenly around 35 percent in 2004-07 from
about 27 percent in 2001-03, and skyrocketed to 62.76 percent in 2008.
In short, the development of new financial instruments and financial innovations in
the creation and intermediation of the globally accepted collateral promoted the large
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broker-dealers to pursue the procyclical leverage through repo market, overstretching their
balance sheets during the US housing bubble.
V.II. The rapid creation of repo liabilities to non-US residents during the US housing
bubble
Remarkably, the overstretched nature of balance sheets at the broker-dealers, driven
by procyclical leverage during the US housing bubble, were accompanied with the rapid
expansion of external balance sheets at banks and other financial firms in the US
(henceforth, US financial firms), including mainly US-owned banks, US-owned brokerdealers, foreign-owned banks, and foreign-owned broker-dealers, in the 2000s prior to the
GFC. Many economists and policymakers have discussed that the rapid expansion in gross
capital flows in the 2000s is important for understanding the buildup of global financial
instability that led to the GFC. (For instance, Borio and Disyatat (2011); Shin (2012);
Tokunaga and Epstein (2018)) Gross cross-border banking positions to non-US residents
reported by US financial firms were substantial in the 2000s. At the end of 2007, gross
claims reached about $3.8 trillion, and about $4.2 trillion in gross liabilities. (Bertaut and
Pounder (2009), A156) This implies that US financial firms increased simultaneously both
assets and liabilities at their external balance sheets. We can see the simultaneous increase
in both external assets and liabilities at US financial firms’ balance sheets in the 2000s, in
the following quotation from Survey of Current Business published by the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA)
“(In 2004: author), these large outflows (US external assets: author) from U.S. banks and
U.S. securities brokers were nearly matched by large inflows (US external liabilities: author)
to U.S. banks and U.S. securities brokers; most of the inflows and outflows were channeled
through the United Kingdom and the Caribbean.” (Bach (2005), 40)
As the quotations shows, US financial firms had expanded round-tripping banking flows
vis-à-vis the UK, the largest eurodollar-offshore financial markets, and the Caribbean
offshore financial centers (OFCs) in the 2000s prior to the GFC. Around 80 percent of gross
external positions on assets and liabilities reported by US financial firms are financial firms’
own accounts, whereas the remaining 20 percent are custody accounts, in which US
financial firms hold short-term securities and deposits on behalf of their customers.
(Bertaut and Pounder (2009), A156)
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What we here highlight is the rapid expansion of external short-term liabilities
issued by US financial firms in the 2000s. The external issuance of the short-term
liabilities by US financial firms indicates that the US dollar as international money is
supplied from the US financial system to non-US residents. Example of these external
liabilities are deposits of non-US residents placed at banks in the US, loans made by
banks abroad to banks in the US, and repurchase agreements, which are collateralized
short-term loans made by non-US residents to US residents. (Weinberg, Whitaker and
Tenentes (2009), 64) In what follows, we focus on how US financial firms, especially the
broker-dealers, created their short-term liabilities to non-US residents in the 2000s prior
to the GFC, based on time series data of “liabilities to foreigners reported by banks and
other financial firms in the US” by US Fed, and articles about US international
transactions and US international position from Survey of Current Business by the US
BEA. We identify two main characteristics in term of type of US financial firms’ own
liabilities in the 2000s, presented in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Type of Financial Firms’ own Liabilities in the US
(millions of dollars, percentage, end of period)
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Note: Before December 2013, reporting firms include all types of depository institutions as well as some
bank holding companies and brokers and dealers. In addition, data include all other nonbank financial
firms since December 2013. Excludes bonds and notes of maturities longer than one year.
Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System.

First, US financial firms have borrowed a large amount of short-term dollar funds by
placement of deposits through interoffice transfer with own foreign office in OFCs.5 The
share of “deposits” reached 44.98 percent in US financial firms’ own liabilities in 2006.
Second, more notably, a new type of the issuance of short-term instruments, that is
repurchase agreement could increasingly be recognized as the important component in US
financial firms’ own liabilities in the 2000s. The outstanding of repurchase agreement
increased abruptly from $151 billion in 2001, when its data became available, to about $1
trillion in 2006. The share of repurchase agreement in financial firms’ own liabilities
amounted to 35.19 percent in 2006. We can confirm that US broker-dealers increased
repo-based borrowing on own accounts from hedge funds and other nonbanks in the UK
and the Caribbean in the 2000s, as can be seen in the following quotations from Survey
Current Business:
“(In 2004: author) U.S. financial institutions borrowed large amounts of funds from
offshore sources…the large increase in liabilities was related to the sizable increase in
repurchase activity in the securities markets, including activity with hedge funds in the
Caribbean…Sizable borrowing by U.S. brokers from foreign nonbanks reflected an increase
in repurchase activity, in large part with international mutual funds and hedge funds in the
Caribbean.” (Bach (2005), 42-43)
“Liabilities of U.S. securities brokers increased $32.7 billion in 2006, compared with an
increase of $13.0 billion in 2005. The increase was largely in the form of repurchase
agreements with nonbanks in the United Kingdom.” (Bach (2007), 42)
In turn, relating to the area and country of liabilities to non-US residents, the
Caribbean counted up 43.36 percent, the UK 23.08 percent, other Europe excluding the UK
15.42 percent, Asia 10.98 percent and Latin America 4.07 percent, respectively, in 2006.
This tendency already appeared in the 1970s. By 1970s, US banks were the most powerful participants in the London’
eurodollar market. To the point where it became almost an extension of the New York money market. (Burn (2006), 29)
5
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(Figure 4)

Figure 4 Area or Country in Financial Firms’ own Liabilities in the US as End of 2006
(percentage)

Note: Reporting firms include all types of depository institutions as well as some bank holding companies
and brokers and dealers.
Source: The data from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System.

The sum of the Caribbean and the UK accounted for about 57 percent in total liabilities.
With respect to the latter, US nonbanks such as broker-dealers and hedge funds had
increasingly relied on repo-based dollar borrowing from London, where most of the
eurodollars are recycled on a global scale, since the mid-1990s. (McGuire (2004)) Thus, US
broker-dealers relied extensively on repo-based short-term dollar funding vis-à-vis OFCs in
the 2000s before the GFC.
In the end of the section, we overview again the expansion of US financial firms’
liabilities to non-US residents, driven by the increase in the creation of repo liabilities by
US broker-dealers in the 2000s prior to the GFC. Figure 5 illustrates the outstanding of
liabilities to foreigners by US financial firms, world GDP and world export of goods and
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services since 1971 (Index:1971=1), in the Nixon Shock, when the US lacked the external
discipline of its balance-of-payments deficits.
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Figure 5 The outstanding of liabilities to foreigners reported by financial firms in the US
(Index:1971=1)

Note: Before December 2013, reporting firms include all types of depository institutions as well as some bank
holding companies and brokers and dealers. In addition, data include all other nonbank financial firms since
December 2013. Excludes bonds and notes of maturities longer than one year.
Source: Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System; World Bank.

Overall, the outstanding of liabilities to non-US residents had gradually increased until the
1990s. Most surprisingly, it had drastically risen since 2000, and reaching from 22.29 in
2000 to 66.86 in 2008. The average growth rate of liabilities to foreigners in 2001-08 was
15.23 percent, in comparison with 7.18 percent in the 1990s. Remarkably, the divergence
of the outstanding of liabilities to non-US residents from the size of world economic growth,
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which is embodied in world GDP and world export of goods and services, had broaden
since the 1980s, especially the 2000s prior to the GFC.
In consequence, the drastically increased divergence of US financial firms’ external
liabilities from the volume of world economic growth in the 2000s could be considered as
the explosion of USD-denominated financialization in the global context. Because the
volume of supply of US dollar as international money from the US financial system to nonUS residents transcended the size of world economic growth on a gigantic scale in the
2000s before the GFC.6

6 The routes of supply of US dollar as global money to the world include not only the issuance of dollar liabilities to
non-US residents from US financial system, as we here discuss, but also the lending and borrowing between non-US
residents each other. With respect to the latter, offshore dollar credit reached about $8 trillion, whereas its euro and
yen counterparts amounted to $2.5 trillion and $0.6 trillion, respectively, in the middle of 2014. (McCauley et al. (2015,
1))
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V. The revised US Treasury securities standard system since the Global Financial Crisis
V.I. The lack of dynamics in the procyclical leverage at the broker-dealers
In this section, we explain the revised US Treasury securities standard system since
the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2007-09. The heightened pressure in securities markets
and the collapse of short-term wholesale funding markets had negative impacts on the
balance sheets at US financial firms during the GFC. Specifically, external assets and
liabilities reported by US financial firms decreased suddenly since the second quarter of
2008 after the rapid increases in the previous consecutive quarters, as a result of a sharp
retrenchment in international lending and borrowing by them. The average growth of US
financial firms’ own liabilities was -3.60 percent in 2008-09, compared with 18.60 percent
in 2004-07. (The data from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System; See again Figure
3) US broker-dealers’ own liabilities fell sharply in third quarter of 2008 when the
bankruptcies of Lehman Brothers and American International Group (AIG) hit the world
financial markets. Especially, repurchase agreement transactions collapsed abruptly in
2008 and 2009, amounting to -43.81 percent and -9.90 percent, respectively. (The data
from Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System; see also Figure 3) Because market
participants in the repo market stopped suddenly lending each other and the haircuts
increased strongly. We can confirm the collapse in short-term borrowings through the repo
market by US broker-dealers from the quotation from Survey of Current Business as below:
“As with banks’ own claims, there were substantial changes in banks’ own liabilities in
September (of 2008: author). U.S.-owned brokers’ liabilities fell sharply, mostly reflecting
brokers' repayments of funds at the maturity of repurchase agreements, which are an
important short-term borrowing instrument for brokers. New borrowing was limited by the
bankruptcy of a major U.S. investment bank and funding difficulties at other U.S.
investment banks.” (Weinberg and Sauers (2009), 33)
Next, relating to the area and country of liabilities to non-US residents, the Caribbean
and the UK has decreased since the GFC. While the share of the former fell into 27.10
percent in 2017 after reaching a peak of 43.36 percent in 2006, the latter dropped into
19.63 percent in 2017 after amounting to a peak of 23.08 percent in 2006. (The data from
Board of Governors of Federal Reserve System) Thus, US broker-dealers’ own liabilities
decreased vis-à-vis OFCs since the GFC.
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Why did the deleveraging of the balance sheets at the broker-dealers bring about,
given the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus? First, the market values of the US
private-label securitized debt securities and US Agency bonds as collateral assets
collapsed suddenly after the GFC. When the sharp fall in the collateral assets, driven by
the end of the US housing bubble, forced large broker-dealers to ‘run’ on repos, a large
portion of the US privately-securitized debt securities and US Agencies were no longer
accepted as good collateral, that is C2, based on Singh and Stella (2012). The falling down
in the US privately-securitized debt securities and US Agencies, as well as Italian and
Spanish government bonds, led to the dramatic fall in the quantity of global safe assets
during the GFC. The outstanding of global safe assets decreased from $20,548 billion in
2007 to $12,262 billion in 2011, and the ratio to world of GDP fell down from 36.9
percent to 18.1 percent, respectively. (Table 1)

Table 1 A List of Safe Assets: Pre-and Post-Crisis

Source: Reproduced from Caballero et al. (2012), 32.
Data from Barclays Capital, Federal Reserve Flow of Funds, Haver Analytics, and Barclays Capital.
Note: Numbers are struck through if they are believed to have lost their “safe haven” status after 2007. GSE
means “government-sponsored enterprise.” ABS means “asset-backed security.”

Due to the plunge in the supply of safe assets during the GFC, most of C2’ market value
was lost. The sudden collapse of C2’ market value reduced the volume of repo-based
short-term dollar borrowings that could be raised by large broker-dealers. It turned out
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that the drying-up in the short-term dollar borrowings in repos, led by a significant
decline in C2’ market value as collateral, triggered a drastic contraction of their balance
sheets during the GFC. Second, the decline in the reuse of collateral assets contributed to
the deleveraging of the balance sheets at the broker-dealers. As explained before, the
velocity of collateral reached a peak of 3.0 in 2007. But the rate has persistently fallen
since the GFC, and the velocity of collateral was only 1.8 (= volume of pledged collateral
($6.1 trillion) / primary collateral sources ($3.3 trillion)) in 2016. The continuous decline
in the velocity of collateral in the 2010s results, partly, from the broker-dealers optimize
their balance sheet in the aftermath of new financial regulations to overcome balance
sheet constraints. (Singh and Goel (2019), 15)
In short, because the development in new financial instruments and financial
innovations in the creation and intermediation of the globally accepted collateral has
stagnated, the procyclical leverage at the broker-dealers lacked its dynamics in the 2010s.
V.II. The maintenance of the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus
In contrast, with the onset of the GFC, foreign investors purchased drastically US
Treasury securities. First of all, monetary authorities in Asian countries, especially China,
have continued to use their surplus dollars for investing toward US Treasury securities as
foreign exchange reserve since the GFC. China and Japan have remained the largest
country holders, at $1,192 and $1,033 billion respectively, or over one-third of total foreign
holdings of Treasuries as of June 29, 2018. (Department of the Treasury, Federal Reserve
Bank of New York, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2019), 20) In
addition, more importantly, foreign private investors have strongly purchased US
Treasuries as the globally accepted collateral since the GFC.7 There were two reasons. First,
because the deleveraging of the balance sheets at the broker-dealers resulted in that only
C1---US Treasury securities---could function as the globally accepted collateral for shortterm funding in repo market in the 2010s. Second, the turnarounds in financial policy and
7 The flight to US Treasuries appeared also in US financial firms’ custody liabilities during the GFC. The custodian
banking services provide two main services: specialized reporting services and banking services for investors and
investment firms. The latter includes collateral management. (Chan et al. (2007), 11-12) For instance, institutional
investors, which manage the institutional cash pools, select custodian banks based on their ability to help enhance the
return on their investment portfolio, via services in securities lending, tri-party repo and cash management. (Chan et al.
(2007), 26) The share of U.S. Treasury bills and certificates in US financial firms’ custody liabilities jumped from 26.71
percent in 2007 to 55.83 percent in 2008, and rising to 66.19 percent in 2013. (The data from Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve System)
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regulation since the GFC were instrumental to enhance the market-driven demand for US
Treasury securities as the globally accepted collateral. The quantitative easing (QE) in
developed countries reduce availability of good collateral such as US Treasury securities in
exchange for excess reserves at central banks. (Singh and Goel (2019), 11) The drastic fall
in supply of good collateral, led by the QE, intensified the imbalances between supply and
demand for US Treasuries, as the demand for them surged. This increase in the imbalance
implies generates excessive demand for US Treasuries in the 2010s. And then, the new
financial regulation frameworks enhance the demand for US Treasury securities. For
example, two new regulatory liquidity ratios for banks under the Basel III frameworks are
implemented in the 2010s. The first is the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) in 2015, which is
based on the concept of holding a stock of liquid assets to resist a high degree of stress for
a 30-days. The second is the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) in 2018, which is based on
managing the potential mismatch between asset and liability maturities up to a one-year
period. In order to expand the liquidity buffers, banks have increased their holding of
government bonds such as US Treasuries, enabling them to increase the LCR. The ratio of
the LCR at banks amounted to around 150 percent in 2016 and 2017. (IMF (2018), 64-66)
As foreign official and private ownerships of US Treasury securities have risen since
the GFC, the involvement by non-US residents in the US Treasury securities market has
rapidly increased. Major holders of US Treasury securities in 2001-18 is demonstrated in
Figure 6.
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Figure 6 Major Holders of US Treasury Securities
(Outstanding, millions of dollars, end of period)

Note: Government-related institutions: state and local governments, federal government retirement funds,
state and local government employee defined benefit retirement funds, and government-sponsored
enterprises. Commercial banks: US-chartered depository institutions, foreign banking offices in the US, Banks
in US-affiliated areas, and credit unions. Nonbanks: Property-casualty insurance companies, life insurance
companies, private pension funds, money market funds, mutual funds, closed-end funds, exchange-traded
funds, issuers of asset-backed securities, security brokers and dealers, and holding companies.
Source: US financial Account of the United States.

Rest of the world (ROW)’ holding of US Treasuries have abruptly increased since the GFC,
especially between 2008 to 2014. The outstanding of the ROW expanded from $2,376.4
billion in 2007 to $6,158.0 billion in 2014. What is more, monetary authority, that is the US
Fed, has accumulated a large amount of US Treasuries by introducing the QE, through
which the Fed absorbs US Treasuries from the market in exchange of excess reserves at the
Fed. The outstanding of monetary authority rose from $475.9 billion in 2008 to $2,736.2
billion in 2014. The share of the ROW and monetary authority in total of holdings was 41.85
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percent and 18.60 percent, respectively, in 2014. Thus, the heavy purchase of non-US
residents and the Fed could sustain a market value and creditworthiness of US Treasury
securities in the 2010s.
US Treasuries continue to serve as the globally accepted collateral which enables
financial institutions and private investors to borrow cheaper short-term dollar funds in
the 2010s. US Treasuries account for high share in collateral assets in US repo market. First,
US Treasury securities are the dominant form of collateral for US bilateral repo market. US
Treasury securities posted in US bilateral repos amounted to 79.02 percent, whereas all
other assets made up 20.98 percent as of October 2014. (Copeland et al. (2014)) Second,
the total value of the triparty repo market was approximately $1.6 billion with
approximately 81 percent involving US Treasuries and US agencies as of October 2013.
(Scott (2016), 55) In short, the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus maintains in the
2010s.
However, the lack of dynamics in the procyclical leverage through repo market, led by
the decline in new financial instruments and financial innovations in the creation and
intermediation of the globally accepted collateral, facilitates the USD-denominated
financialization in the global context to be sluggish in the 2010s. Looking back to Figure 5,
the growth of outstanding of liabilities to non-US residents has stagnated and been
relatively flat in the 2010s, compared to the explosion in the previous decade. The growth
of liabilities to non-US residents was -7.57 percent in 2010, -3.00 percent in 2012, -1.84
percent in 2015, and -1.76 percent in 2016. And, the average growth rate of the liabilities
to non-US residents fell into only 1.04 percent in 2009-17, in comparison with 15.23
percent in 2001-08. Hence, the lack of dynamics in the procyclical leverage led US financial
firms to decrease USD-denominated short-term liabilities, particularly repo liabilities, to
non-residents, as opposed to their rapid increase in the 2000s. Accordingly, it could be
interpreted that the USD-denominated financialization in the global context faces a
structural break in the 2010s, though the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus retains
in the 2010s.
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VI. Implications
In the last section, we consider two questions. What is the difference between the
revised US Treasury securities standard system in the 2000s and the past system in the
1970s? And, how does the revised US Treasury securities standard system change in the
2010s?
First, we have argued that the US Treasury securities served as the globally accepted
collateral for creating new type of USD-denominated short-term liabilities, that is repo
liabilities, to non-US residents, given the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus in the
2000s.
In case of the US Treasury securities standard system in the 1970s, monetary
authorities in developed countries intervened countercyclically to absorb the surplus
dollars, in order to stabilize the value of dollar in cooperation with the US. This
countercyclically official intervention in foreign exchange markets by major advanced
countries worked well to sustain the US-centered global financial system, despite the
absence of systemic cooperation in the BW system.
Considering our discussions on the revised US Treasury securities standard system in
the 2000s, the intensification in the market-driven demand for US Treasury securities as
the globally accepted collateral amplified the procyclicality in the creation of repo liabilities
by US broker-dealers to non-US residents during the US housing bubble. Therefore, it is
conceivable that the market-driven demand for US Treasury securities as the globally
accepted collateral drove the surplus dollars to expand to non-US residents, rather than
absorbing them from non-US residents, thus contributing to the explosion of
financialization in the global context that led to the buildup of global financial instability in
the 2000s.
Second, we analyzed that the procyclical leverage during the US housing bubble
allowed large broker-dealers in the US and Europe to create repo liabilities to non-US
residents, given the US Treasury securities-repo market nexus. Notably, the drastically
increased divergence of US financial firms’ external liabilities from the volume of world
economic growth in the 2000s could be considered as the explosion of USD-denominated
financialization in the global context. This development enabled Wall Street financial
institutions to achieve high financial profits in the 2000s prior to the GFC.
In contrast, the procyclical leverage at the broker-dealers lacked its dynamics in the
2010s, owing to the stagnation in development in new financial instruments and financial
innovations in the creation and intermediation of the globally accepted collateral. This lack
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of dynamic in the procyclicality facilitated US financial firms to depress short-term liabilities
to non-residents, resulting in the stagnation in the development of USD-denominated
financialization in the global context in the 2010s. This underdevelopment of USDdenominated financialization in the global context is accompanied with the difﬁculties of
attaining high financial profits at Wall Street financial institutions in the 2010s. The return
on assets (ROA) and the return on equity (ROE) of US ﬁnancial institutions had been so
high from the early 1990s, and the middle of the 2000s was exceptionally high. After
collapse of their high financial profit during the GFC, it recovered briefly in the early 2010s
but has never returned to the previous levels. (Lapavitsas and Mendieta-Muñoz (2018),
497) Accordingly, the structural stagnating in the USD-denominated financialization in the
global context can be considered that Wall Street financial institutions cannot still rebuild
new business model which could enable them to achieve high financial profits as they did ,
depending heavily on cheaper dollar borrowings, in the 2000s, though the revised US
Treasury securities standard system continues in the 2010s.
Acknowledgement:
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